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The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters) has opposed
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) since the treaty's
inception. The labor union's current campaign of opposition focuses on a
Department of Transportation (DOT) and Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) pilot program that grants a limited number of
Mexico-domiciled trucks access to U.S. roadways for one year.' The pilot
program is an effort to finally comply with NAFTA Annex I, intended to
liberalize cross-border trucking between the United States, Mexico, and
Canada.2
While the Teamsters' opposition campaign focuses on alleged
differences in U.S. and Mexican trucking safety standards, the underlying
motive is protectionism. 3  Both the purported and veiled motives are
misguided however, because the program stands to benefit the entire North
American trucking industry, create jobs in both countries, and present the
Teamsters with the chance to expand influence into Mexico.
Part I of this comment lays out the basic structure of the Bush pilot
program and outlines the general arguments anchoring the Teamsters'
opposition. Part II discusses the history of NAFTA and the specific
NAFTA trucking program, and charts the controversy surrounding the
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Northwestern University. I would like to thank my friends and
family for their support, especially my father for his help with the idea for this comment, and
my fianc6 Matt for his love and patience.
1 Paul M. Krawzak, Teamsters Continue Battle Against Truck Initiative, SIGN ON SAN
DIEGO, Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/20070906-1228-
bn06trucks2.html.
2 Editorial, Fears About Mexican Trucks Are Unfounded, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Sept. 14,
2007, at A8.
3 See Michelle Chen, Racism Seen in Liberals' Opposition to Mexican Truckers, NEW
STANDARD NEWS, Mar. 28, 2007, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfin/items/4569;
Fears About Mexican Trucks Are Unfounded, supra note 2; Posting of Porter Corn to Life on
the Road blog, http://lifeontheroad.com/207/10/06/the-numbers-dont-add-up/319.html (Oct.
6, 2007, 10:37am) [hereinafter Corn].
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implementation of these provisions. Part III examines the current status of
the NAFTA trucking debate and the Bush pilot program, and looks at the
various legislative attacks on completing NAFTA implementation. Part IV
offers an overview of the trucking industry's organized labor landscape in
both the United States and in Mexico. Part V explores why the Teamsters
oppose opening the border to Mexican truckers, and finally, Part VI argues
that the Teamsters should support implementation of the NAFTA trucking
provisions.
I. THE CROSS BORDER DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
Although the United States allowed Canadian trucks to cross the
border unrestricted shortly after NAFTA became effective in 1994,
Mexican access is still highly restricted. Trucks originating from Mexico
can only travel in "commercial zones"-roadways within twenty-five miles
of the United States-Mexico border.4 At the edge of commercial zones,
Mexican carriers transfer their goods to U.S. trucks, and the U.S. trucks
then deliver the goods to destinations inside the United States.5  The
expensive and risky transfer of goods between the Mexican and the U.S.
trucks creates a strong disincentive for U.S. companies to purchase
Mexican goods, and to use Mexican carriers to transport those goods.6
The Cross Border Demonstration pilot program was a one-year
program implemented by the Bush administration, "under which Mexican
carriers can transport goods from Mexican to the United States and back.",
7
The Cross Border Demonstration pilot program stops inefficient transfers
by allowing Mexican trucks to transport goods originating in Mexico to
their final destinations within the United States. As part of the program,
the DOT plans to issue permits to operate in the United States to about 100
Mexican trucking firms that operate approximately 500 trucks. 9 As of
August 2008, 26 Mexican carriers operating 107 trucks participate in the
program. 10
4 Oscar Avila, Mexican Trucks Ready to Roll, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2007, at 13; Dave
Montgomery, Senate Red-Lights Mexican Truck Plan, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept.
12, 2007, at C3.
5 Avila, supra note 4, at 13; Montgomery, supra note 4, at C3.
6 See Fears About Mexican Trucks Are Unfounded, supra note 2 (quoting State Senator
John Kyl of Arizona as saying "[tihey [Mexican products] are fresher, less expensive, and
they can be even more fresh and less expensive if they don't have to offload the cargo and
reload it onto American carriers to be transported to (their) final destination.").7Fears About Mexican Trucks Are Unfounded, supra note 2.
8 Id; Montgomery, supra note 4, at C3.
9 Montgomery, supra note 4, at C3.
10 Andy Leonatti, Transportation Panel Votes to Halt Mexican Truck Program,
CONGREss DAILY, July 31, 2008, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/
mr_20080731 1523.php?related=true&story 1 =null&story2=null&story3=null.
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The pilot program has come under fierce attack with the most vocal
opposition coming from organized labor."' The opposition to liberalizing
the border, however, is unfounded. The opposition is a mask for job
protectionism, potentially harmful to member truckers, and detrimental to
the growth of the trucking industry in general. 12 In reality, the Teamsters
should support the measure because it will have a positive impact on U.S.
truckers: cross-border transport will create new trucking and employment
opportunities for U.S. citizens in the United States and in Mexico, will not
threaten U.S. jobs, and is a perfect opportunity for the Teamsters to spread
progressive labor rights and protections throughout North America.
The Teamsters wage a two prong attack on the trucking measure
focused on safety. First, they contend that allowing Mexican trucks into the
United States seriously threatens the safety and security of U.S. roadways
and the U.S. citizens who drive on them. 13 The union argues that Mexican
trucks are old, unreliable, and that they fail to meet FMCSA's safety
requirements. 14 They also contend that Mexican drivers are highly under-
regulated, are not held to the same high safety standards as U.S. drivers, and
regularly engage in activities that endanger U.S. drivers.15 As Teamsters'
President James Hoffa remarked at a Teamsters International Convention:
The Teamsters will not let these time-bomb [Mexican] trucks on our
highways to threaten the lives of American drivers and their families.
Trucking companies in Mexico need to adhere to the same
regulations and standards that our companies and drivers are subject
to. 6
Statistics indicate, however, that Mexican trucks and truckers are no
more dangerous than their U.S. counterparts. U.S. trucks are cited for
l1See, e.g., Posting of Keep on Truckin' to Trucker Talk-Truck Blog,
http://www.truckertotrucker.com/trucker/1/2007/09/Mexican-Truck-Program-Hits-
Roadblock.cfm (Sept. 14, 2007, 5:47pm) [hereinafter Keep on Truckin'].
12 Chen, supra note 3; Corn, supra note 3.
13 Lee Sustar, Should the U.S. Ban "NAFTA Trucks, " SOCIALIST WORKER, Aug. 3, 2001,
at 15; Press Release, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Teamster Delegates Stand
Strong Against Cross-Border Trucking (June 28, 2006), available at
http://www.teamster.org/press-release.aspx?id=10558; Keep on Truckin', supra note 11.
14 See Charles Walker, Mexican Truckers & the Teamsters, SOCIALIST ACTION,
http://www.geocities.com/arcticreds/truckers.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
15 Sara J. Fitzgerald, Why Stricter Standards on Mexican Trucks Will Hurt Our Neighbor
and Ourselves, THE HERITAGE FOUND., Aug. 10, 2001, http://www.heritage.org/Research
/LatinAmerica/EM766.cfm; Luige del Puerto, Federal Program Allowing Mexican Trucks
Deeper into the Country Causes Uproar in Arizona, ARIz. CAPITOL TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007;
Corn, supra note 3. See Walker, supra note 14.
16 Teamster Delegates Stand Strong Against Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 13.
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safety violations at a higher rate than Mexican trucks, 17 and a recent study
found that U.S. drivers violate hours-of-work requirements eight times
more often than Mexican drivers.18  Moreover, in 2008, 6.9% of U.S.
drivers inspected at the border were taken out of service, compared to only
3.1% of Mexican drivers. 19
The second prong of the Teamsters' argument focuses on homeland
security and well-being concerns. The Teamsters vehemently assert that
Mexican trucks and their contents threaten homeland security, and that
Mexican truck drivers will steal jobs and depress wages for scores of
hardworking U.S. citizens. 20 The labor union questions the DOT's ability
to monitor and inspect the goods that are transported across the border,
which may permit the transport of illegal or dangerous materials, including
illicit drugs, into the United States.21 Moreover, the union contends that
Mexico's lenient trucker regulation and sub-par wages will encourage U.S.
carriers to set up shop south of the border.22
These fears are also groundless. The U.S. government has increased
funding for border inspection facilities and hired more inspectors to ensure
proper oversight.23  Additionally, program supporters continually vow to
ensure appropriate inspection, and to hold Mexican carriers to U.S. trucking
standards.24 Furthermore, the U.S. trucking industry is almost twenty times
larger than the Mexican trucking industry, making it extremely unlikely that
17 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, NAFTA Safety Stats: Annual Summary,
http://ai.ftncsa.dot.gov/intemational/border.asp?redirect=-GenStats.asp (last visited Feb. 2,
2009) [hereinafter NAFTA Safety Stats].
18 Chen, supra note 3.
19 NAFTA Safety Stats, supra note 17.
20 Avila, supra note 4; Fears About Mexican Trucks Are Unfounded, supra note 2.
21 See Krawzak, supra note 1; Michael R. Skahan, The NAFTA Trucking Dispute with
Mexico: Problem? What Problem?, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 603, 612 (1999).
22 See Avila, supra note 4, at 13 (reporting that the Teamsters have always fought
NAFTA because cheap Mexican labor threatens U.S. jobs, and drives down wages for
American workers); del Puerto, supra note 15 (reporting that senators are opposing the pilot
program because American truckers will lose jobs to lower paid Mexican truckers).
23 Oversight Hearing on the U.S. Department of Transportation's Cross-Border Truck
Pilot Program Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 1 1 0 th Cong. 4(2008) (statement of Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector General U.S. Department of
Transportation) (stating that "FMCSA has implemented plans to ensure every truck is
checked every time it crosses the border .... ) [hereinafter Scovel Statement]; DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, NEW PROGRAM TO ALLOW U.S. TRUCKS INTO MEXICO FOR THE FIRST
TIME EVER, CHANGE WAY SOME MEXICAN TRUCKS OPERATE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES,
Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.dot.gov/affairs/cbtsip/dot2107.htm.
24 See Hale Sheppard, The NAFTA Trucking Dispute: Pretexts for Non-Compliance and
Policy Justifications for U.S. Facilitation of Cross-Border Services, I I MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 235, 236-37 (2002).
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Mexican carriers will take U.S. jobs. 25
Although the environmental impact of allowing Mexican trucks onto
U.S. roads plays a large part in the opposition to the pilot program, labor
unions have not integrated these issues into their cause, and environmental
issues will only be briefly discussed in this comment.26
II. HISTORY OF THE DEBATE
A. Origins of the Cross-Border Trucking Debate
Prior to 1982, Mexican trucks operated freely in the United States as
long as they complied with U.S. safety regulations.27 In 1982, however,
Congress passed the Bus Regulatory Reform Act (BRRA),28 restricting
access to the United States for new motor carriers from contiguous foreign
countries. 29 The president could modify these restrictions for a variety of
different reasons including "obligations of the United States under a trade
agreement," provided that the action was in the best interest of the
country.30
The president quickly lifted the BRRA restrictions for Canadian
trucks, alleging that Canadian truck safety standards were equal or superior
to those in the United States.
31
However, the BRRA restrictions continued to apply to Mexican
trucks.32 Mexican truckers could only operate within specified commercial
zones extending twenty-five miles from the United States-Mexico border in
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.33 As early as 1994, the
Interstate Commerce Commission had already issued 4666 licenses
permitting Mexican carriers to operate in commercial zones. 34  Upon
reaching the commercial zone border, the Mexican truckers transferred their
25 Casey Burgess, The Cross-Border NAFTA Truck Debate, 8 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 279,
291 (2002).
26 See Erica Burgess, Note, Trucks on Our Turf: Seeking to Resolve the International
Inconsistency in Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 601
(2005); Skahan, supra note 21, at 610; Section II.F infra.
27 Lowell Powell, NAFTA Keep on Truckin': Paving the Way for Long-Haul Trucking
Operations between Mexico and the United States, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. 467, 470 (2003).
28 Id. at 470-71.
29 Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: U.S.-
Mexico Dispute on Cross-Border Trucking, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 194, 194 (Sean D. Murphy
ed., 2003) [hereinafter Murphy]; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 237.
30 Murphy, supra note 29, at 194; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 237.
31 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 236-37.
32 Id.
33 Id.; Avila, supra note 4, at 13.
34 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Free Trade but Not Free Transport? The Mexican Stand-Off,
30 DENV. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 91, 92 (2001).
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goods to U.S. trucks, and the U.S. trucks proceeded to the products'
destinations.. These restrictive regulations, however, did not stop Mexican
products from coming to U.S. markets, and the expense of transferring
goods from Mexican carriers to U.S. carriers at the commercial zone border
was passed on to U.S. consumers.35
B. Creation of NAFTA and Annex I
In 1990, Canada, Mexico, and the United States began discussions that
eventually led to the signing of NAFTA in 1992.36 Proponents hailed
NAFTA as an innovative agreement that would eliminate trade barriers,
promote fair competition, and increase investment and business
opportunities for citizens in all three countries.37 Many saw NAFTA as a
victory for free trade, and a symbol of hope and promise for the future
prosperity of North America.38 The overall impact of NAFTA so far has
been positive: between 1993 and 1998, trade between Mexico and the
United States rose 113%. 31 In 2007, the United States' surface trade with
Mexico totaled $286 billion, and U.S. exports to Mexico were valued at $93
billion.4° In April 2008, surface trade between the United States, Canada,
and Mexico reached a new NAFTA-era single month record at $74.2
billion. 41 Furthermore, NAFTA spurred job creation and industrial growth
in Mexico and the United States; the $10 trillion in products and services
that passed between the two countries were produced and performed by 400
million workers.4 2
While there are several sections of NAFTA that impact analysis of the
Mexican trucking dispute, the most important is Annex I because it lays out
the gradual schedule designed to liberalize cross-border trucking between
the United States, Mexico, and Canada. 43 The agreed-to timeline opened
the Mexico-United States border in two steps. First, Mexican trucks would
have complete access to roadways in the four states bordering Mexico--
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The second step permitted
35 See del Puerto, supra note 15.
36 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 237.
37 Id.; Skahan, supra note 21, at 603.
38 See Skahan, supra note 21, at 603.
39 Burgess, supra note 25, at 281.
40 Press Release, Bureau of Transp. Statistics, 2007 Surface Trade with Canada and
Mexico Rose 4.9 Percent from 2006 (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.bts.gov/
pressreleases/2008/btsOl 1_08/htmllbts0l 1_08.html.
41 April Surface Trade Sets NAFTA Record, PAC. SHIPPER, Sept. 7, 2008,
http://www.pacificshipper.com/news/article.asp?ltype=firstwatch&sid=32455.
42 Id.
43 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Annex I, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 605, 704 (1993); Burgess, supra note 26, at 610; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 237.
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Mexican trucks to travel freely on U.S. roadways by January 1, 2000.4
After NAFTA's enactment, all signals indicated that the United States
was willing to uphold its obligations under the agreement. As the Secretary
of the DOT at the time said:
It is clear December [1995] will mark a visible, fundamental change
in the way trade and commerce is conducted in our hemisphere...
the United States is determined that NAFTA is enacted properly and
works right for each of our countries.
45
More than just words, the U.S government took concrete action to
prepare for an influx of Mexican trucks. First, the DOT infused two million
dollars into the four border-states to help them cope with the expected
increase in cross-border truck traffic.4 6 Additionally, on April 24, 1994, the
North American Transportation Summit issued a Memorandum of
Understanding detailing a plan of cooperation between Mexican and U.S.
transportation officials to implement the NAFTA Annex I mandates. 47
Moreover, the United States, Canada, and Mexico worked to create uniform
vehicle inspection and safety requirements through the Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance, ensuring that trucks from all of the countries were safe and
reliable.48
While implementation of Annex I's Canadian timeline progressed on
schedule, the Mexican plan quickly stalled.49 Bending to strong political
pressure, President Clinton halted the progress of the timeline on December
17, 1996, one day before Mexican trucks were scheduled to travel freely in
the border states.50 The President and the DOT cited safety and regulatory
concerns as justification for the sudden setback, including Mexico's lenient
freight weight restrictions, absence of hours-of-service regulations, and
fears that Mexican trucks could not comply with U.S. safety standards. 51
While the United States assured Mexico and the public that they were
working to address these concerns, NAFTA's January 1, 2000 deadline also
44 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 43, at 704; Sheppard, supra note
24, at 237.
45 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 238 (quoting Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pena
Announces Key Measure for Smooth, Safe, and Efficient NAFTA Transition (Sept. 5,
1995)(on file with author)).
46 Jason C. Messenger, Opening the U.S.-Mexico Border: Problems and Concerns for the
Bush Administration, the Countries, and the Legal System to Consider, 9 TuLSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 607, 609 (2002).
47 id.
48 id.
49 Burgess, supra note 25, at 282; Dempsey, supra note 34, at 93; Powell, supra note 27,
at 472; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 238.
50 See Powell, supra note 27, at 471-72; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 238.
51 Messenger, supra note 46, at 609-10; Powell, supra note 27, at 472.
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came and passed unfulfilled.52 Thus, Mexican trucks remained relegated to
commercial zones, transferring their cargo to U.S.-based long haul trucks at
commercial zone borders-slowing the movement of goods and increasing
the price of transport.53
C. The Arbitration Mandate
In response to the United States' failure to fulfill its obligations under
NAFTA, Mexico closed its border to U.S. trucks.54 Mexico also initiated
arbitration proceedings under Chapter 20 of NAFTA, claiming that the
United States breached its obligations under the agreement by failing to
phase out restrictions on cross-border trucks as prescribed in Annex I.55
The United States claimed that safety concerns delayed compliance with the
agreement, and defended its acquiescence to the Canadian timeline by
arguing that it was easier to implement because the United States and
Canada have similar safety and transport regulations.56
On February 6, 2001, a specially convened arbitrational panel
determined that the United States' arguments were unpersuasive, and that
noncompliance with Annex I violated NAFTA.57 The panel ordered that
the United States take all "appropriate steps" to bring its practices regarding
cross-border trucking into compliance with NAFTA."
In accordance with the panel's unanimous decision, the United States
vowed to take "appropriate steps" to rectify the situation.59 President Bush
even went so far as to publicly announce that the United States would soon
be fully compliant with the agreement:
We have assured the Mexican government that we intend to live up
to our NAFTA obligations to open the U.S.-Mexico border to
trucking [and] [d]iscussions are underway on how to implement the
recent NAFTA panel decision in a safe and orderly fashion. 60
The U.S. Secretary of the DOT shared Bush's optimism, stating
"President Bush has made a firm commitment to implement NAFTA
52 Powell, supra note 27, 474.
53 Dempsey, supra note 34, at 91-92.
14 Id. at 93-94.
55 Burgess, supra note 26, at 610-11.
56 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 237.
17 Id. at 239.
58 Id. at 240.
59 Id.; Powell, supra note 27, at 475-76.
60 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 240 (quoting Alan Larson, Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't of
State, U.S. Outlines Potential for Expanded U.S.-Mexico Trade, Remarks before the 54th
Plenary of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee (Mar. 5, 2001), http://www.usinfo.state.gov
/regional/ar/mexico/larson5.htm).
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trucking provisions, and his Administration has begun doing that.",61
D. The DOT Trucking Regulations
In May 2001, as an outgrowth of this commitment, the DOT released
the DOT Trucking Regulations (DOT Regulations).62 These regulations
opened U.S. highways to Mexican trucks, but required that the trucks and
truck drivers fully comply with U.S. safety standards.63 In particular, the
DOT Regulations required that each Mexican carrier certify that its drivers
have the requisite qualifications and insurance levels, and that they comply
with U.S. hours-of-service limits, truck condition standards, and alcohol
and drug testing requirements.64
The DOT Regulations soon came under fire from Congress and a
multitude of different interest groups.65 Opponents expressed skepticism
about the regulations, and doubted the United States' ability to sufficiently
address safety concerns regarding Mexican trucks and truckers.66
To strengthen the DOT assurances of Mexican truck safety, the 2002
Department of Transportation Appropriations Bill (DOT Bill) required that
FMCSA establish an extensive program to ensure adequate inspection,
certification, and verification of Mexican trucks and their drivers.
67
Moreover, the DOT Bill addressed some of the specific concerns Congress
and the interest groups expressed. For example, the DOT Bill required that
Mexican trucks carrying hazardous materials comply 8with the same
standards as U.S. trucks carrying the same substances.6  FMCSA also
adopted regulations for accepting applications from Mexican carriers
wanting to operate in the United States, and developed a comprehensive
safety-monitoring program to regulate Mexican trucks operating between
Mexico and the United States. 69 All of the regulations were built around
the Bush administration's "four core principles": first, the safety of U.S.
highways will not be compromised for compliance with NAFTA; second,
Mexican carriers will be held to the same standards as U.S. carriers; third,
the United States must uphold its obligations under NAFTA; and fourth,
Mexican and U.S. carriers will have equal opportunity and fairness in both
61 Id. at 241 (citing Rossella Brevetti, DOT Proposes Rules to Open U.S. to Mexican
Trucking Entities, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 714 (2001)).
62 Id. at 240; Powell, supra note 27, at 475.
63 Powell, supra note 27, at 475-76; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 241.
64 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 241.
65 Powell, supra note 27, at 475.
66 Id. at 476; Dempsey, supra note 34, at 94-95.
67 Powell, supra note 27, at 476.
68 Murphy, supra note 29, at 194-95.
69 id.
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the United States and Mexico.
70
E. The Legislative Response
With the executive branch's agenda firmly in place, the legislature
took an equally strong stance on the opposite side of the table. The Murray
Amendment was Congress' response to the DOT Regulations and brought
final NAFTA implementation to a screeching halt. The Murray
Amendment grew out of the proposed Sabo Amendment, a radical
proposition to completely preclude use of federal funds to process
applications submitted by Mexican carriers seeking to operate in the United
States. 71 The Murray Amendment was a compromise that adopted the goal
of the Sabo Amendment, but was also consistent with the demands of the
arbitration panel.72
The Murray Amendment placed strict safety restraints on Mexican
carriers, including complete safety audits of the Mexican carriers and safety
compliance reviews at the carriers' headquarters.73  It also called for
implementation of all DOT Regulations and construction of additional
border inspection facilities before any Mexican trucks entered the United
States.74 The Murray Amendment passed in 2001, and although it did not
completely proscribe Mexican carriers' operating in the United States, it
prevented full implementation of the DOT and FMCSA plan until further
safety measures were operational.
75
F. Fighting it out in the Courts
Another minor set-back came when the citizens' rights group, Public
Citizen, sued the government for alleged failure to conduct an
environmental analysis before promulgating the DOT Regulations and
FMCSA regulations. 76 In Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation,
541 U.S. 752 (2004), southern citizens expressed concern that allowing
Mexican truckers into the country would disrupt their lifestyles and harm
the environment that they live in and enjoy. 77 Although the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the disgruntled citizens, the United States Supreme Court
overruled the Ninth Circuit's decision, determining that FMCSA was not
70 Messenger, supra note 46, at 611.
71 K. LARRY STORRES, CRS ISSUE BRIEF TO CONGRESS: MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONS, ISSUES
FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS 14 (May 15, 2003), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc
/awcgate/crs/ibO07O.pdf; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 242.
72 STORRES, supra note 71, at 14; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 242-43.
73 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 243-44.
74 Id.; STORRES, supra note 71, at 14.
75 STORRES, supra note 71, at 14; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 243-44.
76 Burgess, supra note 26, at 614.
77 id.
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required to provide an environmental assessment for the proposed rules
regarding Mexican motor carriers' safety regulations.78 Thus, Public
Citizen effectively delayed DOT and FMCSA progress, but it did not have a
substantial effect on implementation of the NAFTA trucking provisions.79
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEBATE
President Bush's proposal to open the U.S.-Mexico border to Mexican
truckers arose within this tumultuous environment. Unfortunately, the Bush
plan, like all other efforts to lift restrictions on cross-border trucking with
Mexico before it, faces fierce opposition. To begin with, Congress passed
the Dorgan Amendment as part of the 2008 DOT Bill.8° The Dorgan
Amendment prohibits the DOT from spending any federal funds to
establish "a cross-border motor carrier demonstration program to allow
Mexico-domiciled motor carriers to operate beyond the commercial
zones ... ,,8 Congress still worries about the safety of Mexican trucks,
and fears that an influx of Mexican products may harm U.S. manufacturing
and produce industries.82
Another amendment proposed in the Senate, the Cornyn Amendment,
permits using federal funds to implement the Bush pilot program, but places
additional stringent safety requirements on the participating Mexican
carriers. 83 Although the central opposition to a Mexican trucking program
has consistently been safety concerns, the Cornyn Amendment did not pass
the Senate.84  The failure of this measure reflects a hidden agenda-if
safety were the primary concern, Mexican trucks should be permitted to
operate in the United States as long as they comply with U.S. safety
standards. 85
On July 31, 2008 Congress dealt the pilot program another blow when
the House's Transportation and Infrastructure Committee unanimously
78 Id. at 601.
79 See Powell, supra note 27, at 496-97.
80 H.R. 3074, 110th Cong. (2007).
81 Id.
82 del Puerto, supra note 15 (reporting that Arizona state Sen. Karen Johnson supported a
letter sent to the United States Congress urging them to suspend the cross border trucking
program because, "broader road access could mean a flooding of goods, destroying 'any
manufacturing base we have left in this country."').
83 S.A. 2842, 110th Cong. (2007).
84 Id.
85 See Richard Simon, Collision over Truck Bill Looms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at
A 15, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-na-trucks 12sep12,
1,6158442.story?coll=la-news-asection (quoting head of FMCSA John Hill as saying that
the votes to prohibit funding of the Bush pilot program are "a sad victory for the politics of
fear and protectionism and a disappointing defeat for U.S. consumers and U.S. truck
drivers.").
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approved a bill that set September 6, 2008 as the pilot program's mandatory
end date.86 Neither this bill nor the cut in funding, however, deterred the
DOT, as evidenced by the head of the Department's August 4, 2008
announcement that the pilot program will be extended for an additional two
years. 
87
The pilot program was also recently attacked in the courts. In January
2008, The Teamsters, Public Citizen, and the Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Association brought suit against the DOT in the Ninth Circuit,
claiming that the DOT acted unlawfully by continuing the pilot program
after Congress passed the Dorgan Amendment.88 The DOT argues that the
wording of the amendment exempts programs that were already
"established" when the measure was enacted, including the pilot program. 9
The Court has not yet issued a decision in this case.
IV. The Organized Labor Landscape
The Teamsters was founded in 1903,90 and today is one of the largest
labor unions in the United States. 91 The union boasts approximately 1.4
million members from a diverse array of industrial, trade, and service
professions, including a waste division, a warehouse division, and a freight
division.92  The freight division represents more than 80,000 freight
workers, including long-haul truck drivers from approximately 238 unions
across the country.
93
The Teamsters have taken an aggressive stance against Bush's
proposed Mexico-domiciled carrier pilot program.94 Led by their president,
James Hoffa, the Union has exhibited enthusiasm and energy in its
opposition, as Hoffa has vowed "Democrats, Republicans, and
86 Press Release, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Republicans, Bill Halts
NAFTA-Relic Mexican Trucking Program (July 31, 2008), available at
http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewslD=452.
87 Press Release, Walter B. Jones, Jones Denounces Two-Year Extension of Mexican
Trucking Program in U.S. (Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.walterjones
forcongress.com/jones-denounces-two-year-extension-of-mexican-trucking-program-in-us.
88 Rebecca Richards, Peters Seeks Mexico Options as Court Mulls Border Program,
TRANSPORT Topics, July 7, 2008.
89 Id.
90 The Early Years-International Brotherhood of Teamsters, http://www.teamster.org
/history/teamster-history/early-years (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
91 Teamsters Structure-International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
http://www.teamster.org/content/teamsters-structure (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
92 Id.
93 Freight Division, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, http://www.teamster.org
/content/freight-division (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
94 See Teamster Delegates Stand Strong Against Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 13;
Keep on Truckin', supra note 11.
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Independents-everyone wants to keep our highways safe. The Teamsters
are going to stop this madness. We're going to stop George Bush.,
95
The Teamsters argue that the safety of U.S. highways and U.S.
truckers is their primary concern. "The Teamsters will not let these time-
bomb trucks on our highways to threaten the lives of U.S. drivers and their
families. 96 They contend that Mexican trucks do not abide by U.S. safety
regulations, including mandatory driver drug-testing, and are often cited by
vehicle inspectors at the border for poor vehicle maintenance and safety
precautions. 97 As the Teamsters' National Vice-President, Jim Santanglo,
said:
We have a beef with the American Government lying to the
American people [that] these people are under the Department of
Transportation rules and regulations .... [T]his is not about union
organizing these guys, it's all about homeland security and the safety
of America's highways.
98
Moreover, the Teamsters voice homeland security concerns, including
the potential transport of dangerous or illegal materials into the United
States. "We don't know who these drivers are and we don't know what
they're bringing in .... [T]he weapons of mass destruction George Bush is
looking for could be in the backs of these trucks." 99
The Teamsters' propositions have gained credence and support from
some extremely powerful figures. Senator Arlen Specter commented that
the Bush pilot program raised "very serious safety issues," 100 and Senator
Byron Dorgan insisted, "this is about safety .... We don't have equivalent
standards between this country and Mexico. Not yet."''1 Teamsters have
also rallied residents of the United States-Mexico border who fear that
95 Press Release, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Hoffa Denounces Bush's Illegal,
Unsafe Mexican Trucking Program (Sept. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT= 1 04&STORY=/www/story/09-08-
2007/0004658904&EDATE = [hereinafter Hoffa Denounces Program]. See Sustar, supra
note 13.
96 Hoffa Denounces Program, supra note 95; Press Release, Union Resolves to Delay
Implementation Until Safety, Wages, and Working Conditions for Mexican Truckers are at
Highest Levels, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, June 28, 2006, (quoting Teamsters General
President James Hoffa) (on file with author); see also Chen, supra note 3; Fears About
Mexican Trucks Are Unfounded, supra note 2.
97 Chen, supra note 3; Krawzak, supra note 1; del Puerto, supra note 15; Keep on
Truckin', supra note 11.
98 Krawzak, supra note I (quoting Teamsters National Vice-President Jim Santangelo).
99 Hoffa Denounces Program, supra note 95; Teamster Delegates Stand Strong Against
Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 13 (quoting James Hoffa's speech at the Teamsters
Women's Conference at the Hilton-Americas Houston Hotel).
100 Keep on Truckin', supra note 11.
101 Simon, supra note 85, at A15.
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opening the border will generate a large influx of traffic, creating severe
traffic congestion and transforming small towns into noisy truck-stops. 1
02
U.S. unions are not alone in their opposition. One of the largest
Mexican labor unions, Camara Nacional del Autotransporte de Carga
(CANACAR), has also voiced concerns about opening the border between
the United States and Mexico. 103 The Union went so far as to say that "the
border must be completely closed to American trucks," 10 4 and it requested
that the Mexican government nullify the NAFTA trucking provisions
altogether. 105 CANACAR fears that as a result of open transport,
manufacturers in both the United States and Mexico will discriminate
against the smaller Mexican transportation business, and Mexican carriers
will lose business to U.S. carriers in Mexico and in the United States. 1
06
Furthermore, Mexican truckers are at a significant disadvantage to
U.S. truckers because parts, fuel, trucks, and financing are all more
expensive in Mexico; Mexican truckers thus have to charge customers more
to cover operation costs. 10 7 For example, a new tractor-trailer truck costs
about $97,000 in Mexico versus $60,000 in the United States, and on
average, replacement truck tires cost $340 each in Mexico, but only $260 in
the United States. 1
08
V. VEILED PROTECTIONISM
The following sections of this comment will demonstrate that the
Teamsters' fears regarding the safety and security of U.S. roadways are
unfounded, and are only a means to hide the real reason for their discontent:
U.S. protectionism. 10 9  In actuality, the Teamsters should support the
implementation of the Bush pilot program because it will have a positive
impact on employment opportunities for U.S. truckers and U.S. carriers.110
Furthermore, as AFL-CIO President John Sweeney said, "American labor is
as concerned about the rights of workers all over the world as it is about the
rights of workers here in America. The two cannot be separated.""' Thus,
102 Burgess, supra note 25, at 289.
103 See id. at 291.
104 See id. (quoting No Truck with Free Trade, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2001, at 35).
"05 Id. at 292.
106 Id.; Carrier Anne Arnett, The Mexican Trucking Dispute: a Bottleneck to Free Trade.
A Tough Test on the NAFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 561, 606
(2003).
107 Burgess, supra note 25, at 291.
108 Id. (tractor-trailer price represents the cost of a new Volvo or Freightliner tractor-
trailer truck in 2002).
109 See, e.g. Chen, supra note 3; Corn, supra note 3.
110 See Burgess, supra note 25, at 292.
... John Wojcik, Solidarity and Mexican Trucking, PEOPLES WEEKLY WORLD
NEWSPAPER, Sept. 20, 2007, available at http://www.pww.org/article/articleview/11759/.
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the Mexican trucking debate presents a ripe opportunity to support global
labor rights and strengthen organized labor in North America.'
A. Unfounded and Unsupported Concerns
To begin with, FMCSA has repeatedly assured the public that Mexican
carriers operating in the United States will be held to the same safety
standards as U.S. truckers.11 3 The FMCSA guidelines require that Mexican
truckers hold a commercial drivers license, comply with all hours-of-service
rules, submit to mandatory drug and alcohol testing, speak and understand
English, and drive trucks that comply with the minimum standards for U.S.
vehicles. 114 As Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez said when Bush
presented his pilot program to the public: "Safety is the number one priority
and strict U.S. safety standards won't change .... We will continue to
work closely with President Calderon ... [to] further enhance the
commerce of our countries ... without sacrificing safety or security."' 5
In fact, a report issued by the Inspector General for the DOT in 2007
indicated that the DOT fulfilled the majority of safety requirements created
by FMCSA and by Congress through the Murray Amendment.1 6 While the
Inspector General's 2008 report indicates that the available data is too
limited to draw any meaningful conclusions about the safety performance
of the pilot program participants, the report does credit the DOT with
implementing plans to ensure that every truck is checked each time it
crosses the border. 117
Furthermore, the DOT increased the number of vehicle inspection
facilities and the number of inspection personnel. 118 Since 1995, the federal
government has spent more than $500 million to improve border inspection
facilities, and has hired over 600 new federal and state vehicle inspectors." 9
In fiscal year 2002, $56.3 million was appropriated to improve state border
safety inspection facilities at the United States-Mexico border, including
money to Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. 20 In fiscal year
2003 another $46.7 million was appropriated to the DOT for inspection
112 See Chen, supra note 3; Corn, supra note 3.
113 See, e.g. Sheppard, supra note 24, at 272.
114 Department of Transportation, Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program (Feb.
23, 2007), http://www.dot.gov/affairs/cbtsip/dot2107.htm.
115 Id.
116 Chen, supra note 3.
117 Scovel Statement, supra note 23.
18 Id.
119 Id.
120 Department of Transportation, Border Infrastructure Program: Construction of State
Border Safety Inspection Facilities at the U.S./Mexico Border, Dec. 1, 2003,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/borbrf03.htm.
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facility improvement. 121
Moreover, safety inspection statistics gathered by both federal and
state governments have not uncovered large discrepancies between the
safety of U.S. and Mexican trucks and drivers. 122  Each year, the DOT
collects information on motor carriers operating in the United States and
domiciled in the United States, Mexico, or Canada, and publishes the data
as the NAFTA Safety Stats. 123 As of June 2008, 22.7% of the vehicles
inspected by the DOT and domiciled in the United States were taken out of
service due to noncompliance with safety mandates, as compared to only
20.9% of Mexico-domiciled trucks during the same period. 124 The 2008
DOT data also indicate that Mexico-domiciled trucks are involved in
significantly fewer accidents in the United States than both U.S. and
Canadian trucks. 
25
This trend in safety statistics is not new. In 2000, the California
Highway Patrol released statistics on the vehicles passing through their
state-of-the-art border inspection facility at the Otay Mesa port of entry.' 26
Between 1995, when the facility was opened, and 2000, the facility
processed 2.83 million trucks; 63% were from Mexico and 37% were from
California. 127 During that time, 23.2% of the Mexican trucks were placed
out of service, compared to 22.3% of the Californian trucks-only a 1%
difference. 128
Furthermore, safety statistics crush any fears regarding the fitness of
Mexican drivers. According to prior DOT inspection data, U.S. drivers
violated U.S. hours-of-work rules eight times more often than their
Mexican counterparts. 129  Moreover, in 2008, 6.9% of U.S. drivers
inspected were taken out of service, as compared to only 1.3% of Mexican
drivers. 1
30
Not only do safety statistics indicate that Mexican trucks are no more
121 Id.
122 See Burgess, supra note 25, at 294-95; Chen, supra note 3.
123 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, About NAFTA Safety Stats,
http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/international/border.asp?redirect-about.asp (last visited Feb. 2,
2009).
124 NAFTA Safety Stats, supra note 17.
125 The data show that only 70 Mexican trucks were involved in crashes on U.S.
roadways, as compared to 93,394 U.S. trucks. Id.
126 Patrick Osio, Mexican Trucks Fears Are Overblown: Safety Issues Are Being Used to
Protect the Economic Interests of U.S. Transportation Companies, SAN DIEGO




129 Chen, supra note 3.
130 NAFTA Safety Stats, supra note 17.
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dangerous than U.S. trucks, it is also in the Mexican carriers' best interest
to use the highest quality trucks for long-haul trips into the United States. 
131
The individuals running Mexican carriers are sophisticated businesspersons
132intent on modernizing their industry and their country. These
businesspersons are also interested in profiting off of NAFTA, and are
willing to take the necessary steps to reap the largest reward. 133 By sending
their best equipment into the United States, Mexican carriers avoid potential
financial losses that decrease their profits, including towing and repair costs
for broken trucks, increased insurance rates from frequent accidents, and the
high cost of personal injury lawsuits in the United States. 134 Additionally,
Mexican carriers using the highest quality equipment are the most reliable,
and thus have the lowest rates of product spoilage and damage due to
accidents or time lapses. The carriers that are reliable will get the most
business and will be the most successful.
B. The Real Opposition
In light of the above safety statistics, the Teamsters use the safety
argument to belie their real opposition to the Bush pilot program: U.S.
protectionism. 135 The Teamsters are intent on protecting U.S. truck drivers,
and think that U.S. truckers will lose their jobs and their competitive edge
once the border is opened to Mexican carriers. 136  A judge writing a
decision in a dispute involving the Teamsters regarding cross-border
transport noted that the Teamsters believed that they would suffer "both
from the extra competition and from a possible increase in the number of
truck accidents; in their view, the [proposed agreement] threatens both their
pocketbooks and their safety." 
137
This suspicion is justified by, as one journalist put it,
"characterizations of Mexican trucks wildly taking over U.S. highways ....
It's a tactic on the part of the Teamsters and unions in general to scare the
public .... They're creating an enemy to build up their ranks."
138
Teamsters fear that U.S. truckers will lose their jobs once the border is
opened, because "American trucking companies will simply close their U.S.
131 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 260.
132 Id. at 260.
133 Id. at 261.
134 Id.
135 See Chen, supra note 3; Powell, supra note 27, at 496-97; Sheppard, supra note 24, at
255.
136 See Chen, supra note 3; Powell, supra note 27, at 496-97; Sheppard, supra note 24, at
255.
137 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 255 (citing Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena, 17
F.3d 1478, 1480 (1994)).
138 Id. (quoting Teamsters Ask DOT About Change in Highway Access for Mexican
Trucks, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1537 (Sept. 22, 1999)).
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factories and move their headquarters across the border."' 139 The Teamsters
forecast that the majority of U.S. carriers will move to Mexico to take
advantage of lower wages and longer work days. 140 The Teamsters are also
worried that Mexican truckers will drive down U.S. truckers' wages. 141
Some argue that the Teamsters' opposition to a Mexican trucking plan
represents a latent racism towards Mexican truckers, especially because
they did not oppose the opening of the United States-Canada border. 142
Supporting the opening of the Canadian border, however, fits with the
Teamsters' purported concern with safety because Canada and the United
States have similar truck safety regulations, whereas in the past Mexican
regulation was not as stringent.
VI. DISPELLING OLD NOTIONS
A. Mexican Truckers are Not a Threat to U.S. Truckers
The Teamster's protectionist reasons for opposing the Bush Pilot
program are misguided and inconsistent with organized labor's interests.
Mexican truckers do not pose a threat to U.S. jobs or the U.S. trucking
industry. The U.S. trucking industry is vastly larger than the Mexican
trucking industry. 144 Nearly seven million U.S. trucks operated in 2002,
compared to a mere 375,000 Mexican trucks. 145 Thus, even if every truck
in Mexico began carrying cargo loads into the United States, there would
still be a minimal effect on the enormous U.S. trucking industry. 46
Additionally, few Mexican carriers can shoulder the inflated operational
costs of transporting goods beyond the commercial zones, as discussed
previously. 147 At its height, the Bush pilot program will only permit 100
Mexican carriers to operate in the United States, and the carriers will be
awarded permits under the program in small batches. 148  Therefore, the
program is easily halted if it proves detrimental to the U.S. trucking
139 Id. (warning from the Teamsters quoting Teamsters Ask DOT About Change in
Highway Access for Mexican Trucks, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1537 (Sept. 22, 1999)).
140 Id.
141 Chen, supra note 3; Corn, supra note 3.
142 See Burgess, supra note 25, at 298; Chen, supra note 3.
143 Burgess, supra note 26, at 610.
144 See, e.g. Burgess, supra note 25, at 291 (stating that in 2001, the Mexican trucking
industry had 5.36% of the hauling capacity of the U.S. trucking industry); Corn, supra note 3
(stating that in 2005, there were "168,225 two and three axle tractors in... Mexico" and
"more than 3,000,000 [ ] registered in the United States.").
145 Burgess, supra note 25, at 291.
146 Id.
147 Supra Section IV. See Burgess, supra note 25, at 291-92, 297.
148 Simon, supra note 85, at A15.
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industry or Teamsters members.
Moreover, under the pilot program Mexican carriers will only be
permitted to move goods from a point in Mexico to a point in the United
States. 149 Therefore, all goods originating in the United States and staying
in the United States will continue to be transported by U.S. carriers.150 It is
also interesting to note that lifting restrictions at the Canada-United States
border strengthened and expanded the Canadian trucking industry, but has
not disrupted U.S. carriers."'
Furthermore, the United States is experiencing a severe long-haul
trucker shortage.152 In a report published in 2005, the American Trucking
Association estimated that the current trucking shortage is approximately
20,000 truckers. 153  The Association also forecasted that this shortage
would continue to grow over the next ten years; between 2005 and 2015,
economic growth will spur the need for an annual increase of about 2.2% in
the number of long-haul truck drivers, while the supply of long-haul truck
drivers in the United States will only increase at an average rate of 1.6%
annually. 1
54
Thus, the gap between supply and demand of long-haul truckers will
increase each year, necessitating an alternate source of truckers. 55  A
shortfall will have negative implications for the trucking industry: transport
will be delayed, businesses will be less likely to use ground-transport for
deliveries, trucking companies will go out of business because customers
leave, and truckers will lose their jobs. These costs are too burdensome,
especially when Mexican carriers may be able to help fill in gaps left open
by U.S. carriers.
B. Advantages of Opening the Border
Instead of continually thwarting Bush's pilot program, the Teamsters
should support the initiative because it presents opportunities for the
Teamsters' members and organized labor in general. First, opening the
border with Mexico will create more trade between the United States and
Mexico, and thus more work and more profits for everyone. 156 Trade
149 Krawzak, supra note 1; del Puerto, supra note 15.
15o Id.
151 JOAN MACLEAN, ET AL., NAFTA AND THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY (1999),
http://wehner.tamu.edu/mgmt.www/NAFTA/spring99/Groups99/ITAM/transpo2.htm.
152 See GLOBAL INSIGHT, THE U.S. TRUCK DRIVER SHORTAGE: ANALYSIS AND SHORTAGE 4
(2005), available at http://www.gsa.gov/gsa/cm-attachments/GSADOCUMENT/ATA
DriverShortageStudy05-R25-c-dOZ5RDZ-i34K-pR.pdf.
' Id. at 4.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Murphy, supra note 29, at 194; Powell, supra note 27, at 472; Skahan, supra note
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between the United States and Mexico is extremely profitable and
important. Between the signing of NAFTA in 1994 and 2004, trade
between the two countries grew by 19 1%, and more than $250 billion worth
of goods moves between the countries annually. 157 By 2000, trucks became
the main transportation vehicle, moving about 75% of these goods over the
border. 58 In April 2008 alone, surface trade between the United States and
Mexico totaled $25.5 billion, up 12.2% from April of 2007.159 U.S.
carriers, however, do not reap the total benefits of this trade since Mexican
fleets currently control 80% of the cross-border business. 160 Liberalizing
the border will spur U.S. investment in cross-border transport, bringing
more money and more business to U.S. carriers.
Furthermore, Mexico retaliated against the United States by restricting
U.S. access to its highways once it was clear that the NAFTA timeline
would not be implemented. 161 All of the subsequent implementation efforts
and stoppages created tension between the United States and Mexico, and
current President Felipe Calderon's administration is "deeply troubled" by
efforts to block the Bush pilot program. 162 Opening the border mends these
wounds and serves as a catalyst for Mexico to open their highways to U.S.
trucks. 163  Therefore, liberalizing truck transport presents a lucrative
opportunity for U.S. carriers to expand their operations into Mexico, and to
fulfill the needs of both the U.S. and the Mexican markets.
Opening the Mexico-United States border can also have broader
positive implications for organized labor. The Teamsters have the
opportunity to build a strong labor alliance with their neighbors, thus
improving labor conditions and strengthening organized labor throughout
North America. 64 Stronger alliances lead to better working conditions for
both U.S. and Mexican truckers. Instead of focusing on whether Mexican
truckers will drive down U.S. wages, the Teamsters should focus on
ensuring that every trucker in North America receives an appropriate wage.
Furthermore, a larger Teamster-CANACAR alliance holds more weight at
the bargaining table, and can compete more effectively with corporate
interests pushing for further free trade initiatives that may create more
competition in domestic markets. 165
21, at 605.
157 Dempsey, supra note 34, at 91.
158 Id.
9 April Surface Trade Sets NAFTA Record, supra note 41.
160 ld.
161 Dempsey, supra note 34, at 93.
162 Simon, supra note 85, at A15.
163 See, Dempsey, supra note 34, at 91-92.
164 See Chen, supra note 3; Sustar, supra note 13; Wojcik, supra note 111.
165 Chen, supra note 3; Sustar, supra note 13.
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Finally, on a more general note, it is important for the United States to
uphold its obligations under international agreements.' 66  Showing U.S.
citizens and other countries that the United States is dependable and follows
through on international treaties will create more trade and economic
expansion opportunities in the future. 1
67
CONCLUSION
NAFTA was heralded as a victory for free trade, and an agreement that
would revolutionize the relationships between the North American
countries. While NAFTA certainly changed the way Canada, Mexico, and
the United States interact, there is one piece of the treaty that is still not in
effect more than ten years after its signing: Annex I. The trucking
provisions relating to Mexico in Annex I have been attacked at every stage
by aggressive efforts from the United States' largest truckers' union, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The Teamsters assert that Mexican
trucks are unsafe, and fear the potential loss of U.S. jobs. In reality, the
opening of the border and the implementation of the Bush pilot program
would benefit the Teamsters by increasing opportunities for carriers and
strengthening organized labor's standing in the debate.
Although the pilot program is slated to continue for an additional two
years, there are a variety of situations that could greatly impact the
progression of this conflict. While it is unlikely that the Teamsters will
alter their strong opposition to permitting Mexican trucks onto U.S.
roadways, the 2008 elections might have brought a stronger ally into the
White House, whose administration may be willing to tighten control over
the pilot program, or stop the program all together. Moreover, the
Teamsters recently supported a case filed in the Ninth Circuit, alleging that
the proposed extension directly violates the Dorgan Amendment. The court
has not yet issued an opinion on this matter, but the decision could
potentially impact the progression of this debate. Although these unknowns
may change the future of the Mexican trucking debate, it is likely that the
pilot program will continue, but after the extension expires, intense pressure
from the Teamsters and other labor groups may mean the end of full
NAFTA compliance.
166 See Sheppard, supra note 24, at 267 (quoting a U.S. legislator as stating that "the
United States made a solemn commitment under NAFTA to open its borders to Mexican
trucks-just as Mexico promised to do for American trucks. It's time we both kept our
word.").
167 See id. at 267-68 (explaining that the United States has opened Pandora's box by
setting precedent for it and other countries to disregard transnational agreements and by
generally decreasing the level of trust between nations).
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